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'WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
when both parties claim title to the same property. Sinclair v.
Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 30 S.E.2d 398 (1944).
In Summerfield v. White, supra, there is a dictum that seems
to support the position of the court in the Toppins case. Plaintiff
claimed under 0, who had owned that tract in fee, while 0 had
owned defendant's tract as a tenant in common. The court said
that since the cotenant of 0 would not be estopped to claim to the
full extent of his deed, even though hostile to an adjoining tract
owned by 0, "... it is apparent that the two titles in question do
not come from the same source.... ." Id. at 321. Again, there would
be a stronger reason for this holding than that of the instant case,
because defendant claimed under the cotenant as well as under 0.
However, it is submitted that the distinction between "com-
mon grantor" and "common source' as made in the Toppins case
is the correct and logical rule. When there is a common source of
title, such as an undivided tract subsequently divided, an attack
on part of the title is an attack on the whole, and an estoppel is
proper. But when the common grantor has acquired title to the
adverse tract from a stranger to the title of the other tract, and
has conveyed them as separate tracts, doing nothing to merge the
parcels, the validity of the title to one tract will have no effect on
the validity of the title to the other tract, and neither party should
be estopped to attack the title of the adverse claimant.
C. M. C.
INTRaEBENcE WrrH CoN RAcr-ILAB mTY WHE No ENFORCE-
ALE CoNTRAcr.-P owned a tract of land on an island. A contracted
with B construction company to dredge a channel in waters adjoin-
ing P's land. P gave A and B permission to use a strip of his land
for the purpose of depositing the dredged material in a bay adjoin-
ing this land. This would have increased the value of P's land.
P alleged that D, having no right to do so, advised B that if it
proceeded to build up P's land with dredged materials, then he,
D, would sue to restrain the operation. In consequence of D's
action, B deposited the materials elsewhere. D filed a demurrer
on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
for it appeared from the complaint that P had no enforceable con-
tract. Demurrer sustained. Held, that P's complaint failed to state
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a cause of action since P had no enforceable contract with the con-
struction company for such deposit. Judgment affirmed. Morgan v.
Speight, 89 S.E.2d 137 (N.C.1955).
Although this action was based upon wrongful interference
with contract, from the decision the following questions are raised:
(1) whether there must be an enforceable contract before an ac-
tion for wrongful interference with contract will lie; and (2)
whether there could be a cause of action for wrongful interference
with an advantageous relation had there been no contract at all.
In order to maintain an action for wrongful interference with
contract, the plaintiff must allege and prove these essential elements:
(1) that there was a valid contract existing between the plaintiff
and a third party; (2) that the defendant had knowledge of the
plaintiff's contract; (3) that the defendant intentionally induced
the third party to break the contract with the plaintiff; (4) that
the defendant acted without justification; and (5) that the de-
fendant's act caused the plaintiff actual damages. Childress v.
Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954). In the principal
case the court considered only the requirement that there be a
valid contract.
Whether the court was correct in its holding will depend upon
whether a contract is valid although it is unenforceable. In North
Carolina it has been held that although the parties to the contract
would have a defense in an action between themselves, if the
contract is valid, then there can be liability for wrongful inter-
ference with that contract for the intermeddler cannot take ad-
vantage of those defenses. Haskins v. Royster; 70 N.C. 601 (1874).
The Statute of Frauds is not available as a defense to one who
wrongfully interferes with a contractual relationship for it is a
defense which is personal to the parties to the contract. Childress v.
Abeles, supra at 678, 84 S.E.2d at 184. In these decisions the
court makes a distinction between a valid contract and an enforce-
able contract and holds that it is only necessary to have a valid
contract in order to maintain a cause of action for wrongful inter-
ference. Therefore, in the principal case the court should not have
sustained the demurrer on the ground that there was no enforceable
contract alleged. Howeirer, the court might have found that there
was no valid contract and have reached the same result.
In the case of contracts for the sale of land, there is an addi-
tional requirement for the action. Before an action will lie for
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wrongful interference with land sale contracts, the contract must
be registered. Eller v. Arnold, 230 N.C. 418, 53 S.E.2d 266 (1949).
Due to the recording statutes, this is an exception to the rule gov-
erning liability in cases for wrongful interference. See Bruton v.
Smith, 225 N.C. 584, 588, 36 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1945) (concurring
opinion): These decisions do not deny liability on the basis that
the contract was unenforceable but rather on the ground that third
parties are justified in disregarding such contracts until they are
registered. Presumably, if such contracts were enforceable between
the parties because they were in writing or they were partly per-
formed, there still would be no cause of action for wrongful inter-
ference against a third party unless the contract was registered.
Therefore, if the contract in the principal case involved an interest
in land, an easement, the court could have more properly denied
liability on the ground that the contract was not registered.
In the principal case the court did not consider whether a cause
of action would lie for an interference with an advantageous rela-
tion even if there were no contract at all. It has been held that
where there, were certain noncontractual expectancies which were
not realized due to the unjustifiable interference by a third party,
then the intermeddler would be liable. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn.
145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909). For the most part the expectancies thus
protected have been those involving commercial dealings, such as
the prospect of obtaining employment or employees, or the oppor-
tunity of obtaining customers. When the attempt has been made to
extend liability beyond those expectancies, the courts have usually
refused to allow recovery on the basis that there is too much specu-
lation involved in determining whether the plaintiff would have
received the benefit. PRossER, ToRTs § 107 (2d ed. 1955). Since
the courts have protected certain noncontractual expectancies, there
seems to be no logical reason why the courts will not protect other
advantageous relations where it can be proved that the plaintiff
would have received the benefit had it not been for the unjustifiable
interference. In such cases the objection that there is too much
speculation involved, is removed.
In the principal case even if there was no contract between
the plaintiff and the third party, if the plaintiff could prove that
had it not been for the unjustifiable interference of the defendant
he would have received the benefit of the relation, then the plaintiff
should have been able to recover damages for the defendant's
wrongful action. However, there appears to be no case which has
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extended liability to this extent. Also, as this case was decided on
the pleading, the complaint might have been found defective even
under this view.
In conclusion, the court in the principal case might have reached
the same result on the basis that there was no valid contract alleged,
or that the contract fell under the rule governing land sale con-
tracts which must be registered. But the fact that there is no en-
forceable contract alleged is not a sufficient reason to deny liability
under the prior decisions in North Carolina. However, if the situa-
tion was one where the plaintiff would have received the benefit
had it not been for the defendant's unjustifiable interference, then
the plaintiff should have been able to recover although there was
no valid contract between the parties.
R. W. F.
MUNICIPAL CORPOBATIONS-DuTY TO PROTECT PoNiCE INFonMER
- No LxILITY FOR INJURY TO INFORMER. - F, as administrator,
brought an action against the city of New York for the wrongful
death of P's intestate. P's intestate had informed the police of the
whereabouts of a notorious criminal and leader of gangs, and,
through this information, the police apprehended the criminal. The
role the intestate played in the capture was greatly publicized, and
he received countless threats to his person. At the request of the
intestate, the police furnished him some special protection, but later
this protection was withdrawn over the protests of the intestate.
Soon thereafter the intestate was murdered, in gangland fashion,
by a person or persons unknown. P's bill of complaint was dismissed
by the lower court, and he appealed to the intermediate appellate
court. Affirming the order and judgment, held, with one dissent,
that there was no duty on the city of New York to protect P's
intestate, and, if such a duty did exist, the complaint failed to show
that the violation of the duty was the proximate cause of intestate's
death. Schuster v. City of New York, 286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S.
2d 778 (2d Dep't 1955).
It has always been the basic duty of government to protect its
citizens from loss of life, limb or property by unlawful acts. This
duty has traditionally been vested in the various police organiza-
tions. In New York, the city charter imposes upon the police de-
partment the mandatory duty to "protect the rights of persons and
property," to "preserve the public peace," to "prevent crime," to
"detect and arrest offenders" of the law, and to "suppress riots, mobs
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